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Abstract
Effective approaches to non-communicable disease (NCD) prevention require intersectoral action targeting 
health and engaging government, industry, and society. There is an ongoing vigorous exploration of the 
most effective and appropriate role of government in intersectoral partnerships. This debate is particularly 
pronounced with regards to the role of government in controlling unhealthy foods and promoting healthy food 
environments. Given that food environments are a key determinant of health, and the commercial sector is a 
key player in shaping such environments (eg, restaurants, grocery stores), the relationship between government 
and the commercial sector is of primary relevance. The principal controversy at the heart of this relationship 
pertains to the potential influence of commercial enterprises on public institutions. We propose that a clear 
distinction between the regulatory and catalyst roles of government is necessary when considering the nature of 
the relationship between government and the commercial food sector. We introduce a typology of three catalyst 
roles for government to foster healthy food environments with the commercial sector and suggest that a richer 
understanding of the contrasting roles of government is needed when considering approaches NCD prevention 
via healthy food environments. 
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Introduction
A comprehensive approach to non-communicable disease 
(NCD) prevention requires actors to align their actions. NCD 
prevention largely hinges on healthy consumer environments, 
with the key risk factors for the recent rise in the incidence of 
NCDs being commercial products such as tobacco, alcohol 
and unhealthy foods.1,2 Tobacco control interventions 
targeting the consumer environment such as smoke free 
spaces, advertising bans, and legal age limits, have restricted 
access to tobacco products and changed social norms with 
dramatic reductions in population-level consumption.3,4 This 
same logic is often taken up in efforts to shape consumer food 
environments.5 
Government plays a critical role in shaping food environments, 
through interventions that promote the economic 
performance and competitiveness of the agri-food sector, 
public health interventions that control the nature and types 
of foods available to consumers and interventions that seek 
to influence consumer food choice. Governments have been 
most comfortable implementing information-based public 
health interventions. For example, in addition to extensive 
use of social marketing and other education programs, 
the use of nutrition labelling on packaged, processed and 
pre-prepared foods has become common practice for 
governments around the world. Other interventions have 
involved attempts to control the content of food products, 
such as policies banning transfat or restricting the levels of 
sodium in foods. However, these interventions have faced 
significant opposition, including most prominently resistance 
from the food industry. This opposition often results in the 
implementation of non-enforceable and voluntary standards. 
Recent proposals encourage the employment of fiscal policies 
that impose price measures on products deemed unhealthy, 
such as sugary beverages.6,7 Not surprisingly, these types of 
measures continue to be met with massive opposition from 
the food industry.
Despite the often tenuous relationship between government 
and the commercial sector, there is wide recognition that 
to foster healthy food environments there must be a deep 
engagement amongst all relevant actors. Navigating the 
tenuous relationship between government and the commercial 
sector is at the core of the Whole-of-Society8,9 approaches 
underlying the United Nations recommendations to curb the 
progression of NCDs and associated risk factors,2,10 and more 
recently the Sustainable Development Goals.11 This push to 
foster relationships between government and the commercial 
sector is largely captured in the discourse on multi-stakeholder 
partnerships (MSPs), seen by some as a way for partners to 
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leverage unique strengths to foster more effective and wide-
reaching interventions. 
Despite the recognition that MSPs are an important strategy 
to address NCD prevention through intersectoral action, 
they remain highly controversial. The principal controversy 
remains whether governments can work with commercial 
interests in a way that does not sacrifice public interests to 
private ones, and whether private interests can serve the public 
good. In other words, to what extent are MSPs vulnerable to 
shifts away from the public health agenda to special interests 
and do these interests run counter to the collective good? 
Controversies are often centered on whether governments 
can develop sound policies with the public interest in mind, 
particularly as regulators of the market, while in partnership 
with the private sector.2,12,13 This type of controversy is 
salient in a context where large multinational companies 
actively resist being regulated.2,14,15 Given that commercial 
interests do not always align with the public interest and 
in light of evidence that many of the “vectors” of NCDs are 
products actively promoted by industry, the regulatory role 
of governments must be protected from the detrimental 
influence of such interests.16,17 In fact, it is argued with good 
reason that government should never partner with companies 
that produce products known to cause harm to human health, 
with the most obvious being tobacco companies.18 From our 
perspective, the crux of government is how to regulate health 
harming products while simultaneously promoting consumer 
environments that make healthy food choices easy and 
accessible. 
In addition to the regulatory role of governments, it is well 
documented that governments utilize other tools in their 
relationship with the commercial sector to foster healthy food 
environments. Governments can and do play an important 
role in shaping the supply and demand for nutritious food. 
There is an ongoing need to scale-up efforts to promote 
healthy food environments when almost all food consumed in 
high-income countries, and increasingly in low- and middle-
income countries, is procured from commercial sources.19,20 
In other words, governments must not only control the 
proliferation and severity of unhealthy foods, they must also 
promote companies that are making positive strides to build 
healthier food environments. 
In this article, we focus on the different tools that government 
can use to serve as catalysts for healthy food environments. A 
healthy food environment is defined in this paper as one in 
which healthy foods (eg, fruit and vegetables) are accessible, 
attractive and affordable. The objective of this paper is to 
distinguish between the regulatory and the catalyst roles of 
government. We then discuss how these roles can be managed 
to ensure optimal outcomes in the context of MSPs for NCDs 
prevention by fostering healthy food environments.
Government as Regulator 
There are numerous generic classifications of the tools used 
by governments. Vedung offers a simple classification of 
government instruments: regulation (“stick”), economic 
means, such as incentives or inducements (“carrot”) and 
information (“sermon”).21 Hood’s22 typology, uses a similar 
framework but also includes “organization,” which he 
describes as the “capacity (of government) for direct action, 
for instance through armies, police or bureaucracy” (p. 129). 
We present these two classification schemes to demonstrate 
that there has been, and continues to be, a large body of work 
articulating the many ways that government engages with 
market and society beyond the traditional role of regulator.23 
The role and tools of government continue to be thrown into 
flux, particularly with the dominance of market oriented 
theories of society. As noted above, the public health literature 
has focused to a great degree on the regulatory (ie, “stick”) 
role of government and the need to protect the autonomy of 
this function from private interests. It is critically important 
to enrich the discourse on the role of governments in shaping 
healthy food environments by articulating and analyzing the 
other roles played by government. 
Regulation of products and services remains a crucial role 
of government. Law is an important tool to create healthy 
consumer environments.24-26 Governments have achieved 
successes towards reducing the incidence of NCDs by 
regulating products that are particularly harmful to human 
health such as tobacco and alcohol. This regulatory role 
is also indispensable when it comes to ensuring the safety 
of medicines and other products used to treat disease and 
establish laws pertaining to safe practices such as the use of 
protective equipment such as bicycle helmets. 
The regulatory role has been particularly indispensable given 
the history of deceit by certain product manufacturers. The 
case of tobacco is the most dramatic example of a product 
which was widely and aggressively promoted in the absence 
of government regulation to the detriment of human health. 
Parallels have been drawn between this history of unregulated 
tobacco promotion and the contemporary context of the 
largely unregulated promotion of unhealthy food products 
especially to children, and the need for statutory regulation 
by governments.27 
The dominant discourse about the role of government in 
addressing food-related NCDs centers on how the state can 
best regulate the food information environment. An intense 
debate continues about whether food information and food 
content should be controlled through legislative means or 
through standards directed at industry self-regulation.28-30 
When focusing on the regulatory role of public health 
authorities, clear and strong mechanisms to protect the 
autonomy, accountability and transparency of state actors 
involved in law-making are needed. Most governments 
do indeed consult with stakeholders in the law-making 
and regulatory process. However, part of the legitimacy of 
state actors is based on the premise that no one group or 
organization has privileged access or undue influence over 
government decision-making, for example the adoption of 
food taxes.31 
Regulatory capture, the positioning of private special interests 
in place of public interest in public policy, is a pressing and 
perennial challenge for public institutions.32 This phenomenon 
explains why the concerns over conflict of interests have 
remained salient in the media and in research about the role 
of government in addressing NCD prevention.13,15
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Concerns regarding the independence and legitimacy of 
government regulation are so prominent that the World 
Health Organization (WHO) developed a Framework of 
Engagement with Non-State Actors, which clearly outlines 
rules about engagement with non-State actors and identifies 
measures to prevent undue influence.33 It is most clearly stated 
in a statement by the former Director General of the WHO34: 
“WHO may engage with the private sector on occasion, 
but according to WHO policy, funds may not be sought or 
accepted from enterprises that have a direct commercial 
interest in the outcome of the project toward which they 
would be contributing. For this reason, the Organization does 
not accept funding from the food and beverage manufacturers 
for work on NCD prevention and control.” 
As mentioned earlier, when consumers acquire most of 
their food through commercial channels, even in emerging 
economies,35 there can be major benefits for government 
to serve not just as regulators or norm-setters, but also as 
catalysts for change in the consumer food environment. The 
next section discusses the key features of this catalyst role. 
The regulatory role only harnesses part of what government 
can contribute to healthy food environments.36,37 
Government as Catalyst: Typology 
Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs 
of governance are not therefore different from those of 
government. It is rather a matter of process.38 
To begin examining how governments can facilitate healthy 
food environments, we introduce three different catalyst roles 
government can play in MSPs: (1) gathering, interpreting 
and sharing information; (2) facilitating a hybrid form of 
coordination, and; (3) providing or mobilising financial 
resources. Examples are drawn from a strategic analysis of 
a purposive sample of MSPs commissioned in 2013 by Pan-
American Health Organization as part of policy dialogue 
programs. 
Gathering, Interpreting and Sharing Information
We borrow Hood’s39 idea of “nodality” to point to the “capacity 
of government to operate as a node in information networks.” 
Governments are often well situated to facilitate information 
sharing and generation. Governments can capitalize on the 
rapid rise in information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) to facilitate healthy food production and access. Many 
have worked to conceptualize the role of government in the 
era of social media and “big data.” Although this literature is 
too vast to engage with in any meaningful way in this article, 
we draw on one thread from this literature pertaining to the 
new opportunities for government to utilize information 
platforms to facilitate deeper webs of action among different 
stakeholders. Governments have the potential to serve as 
a credible source of information that links consumer and 
commercial practices in order to shape these practices. This 
information role does not exist in a vacuum but should be 
tied to a specific objective, project or program.40 For example, 
governments can play an important role in gathering and 
sharing information on the factors that shape fruit and 
vegetable consumption in a neighborhood, which can feed 
into actions to foster increased density of fruit and vegetable 
vendors. As Bodor and colleagues41 find, proximity to small 
food stores and the space dedicated to fresh vegetables in 
these retail outlets both served as predictors of consumption. 
This type of information in a specific government jurisdiction 
can be used to coordinate and shape the retail orientation of 
vendors. 
Another example is large scale information sharing in the 
European Union (EU) Platform for Action on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health. Operating under the leadership of the 
EU, platform members – such as groups, associations and 
alliances from social, sports, media, agriculture, food and 
public health sectors – have agreed to share information and 
action plans with each other to encourage national, regional, 
and local initiatives across Europe. Perhaps more importantly, 
government impacts the nutritional quality of food supply 
and demand through the development and dissemination 
of information, norms, or coding systems that target both 
education to empower consumers to make healthy choices, 
and actors from the agriculture, food and health sectors that 
altogether define the nutritional quality of supply and demand 
in the food environment.42 
Hybrid Forms of Coordination
Governments can play a catalyst role in facilitating new 
institutional forms of coordination not only between public 
and private actors, but also by building synergy with social 
innovators in non-government organisations, especially when 
they act as brokerage organizations in the creation of MSPs 
for prevention of NCDs that are comprehensive, integrated 
and community-based. Some, like Agita Sao Paulo, promote 
physical activity through public service transportations and 
others, have spread within the country boundary. Others 
like EPODE (‘Ensemble Prévenons l’Obésité Des Enfants’), 
engaged municipal actors from social and commercial 
sectors in promoting healthy lifestyles and environment, 
including but not limited to food, have spread in a franchise-
like mode around the world.43 These community-based 
MSPs typically serve as brokers in engaging local leaders 
from different sectors to address diet and physical activity in 
individuals and families, with supportive programs and socio-
environmental transformation in agriculture, education, 
sports, transportation, media, health, industry, commerce and 
service. In its simplest sense, brokers are actors that bridge 
gaps in the social structures44-46 and facilitate the flow of 
goods, information and opportunities across those gaps.47 In 
this way, brokerage organizations can create new connections 
between previously unconnected actors.
At the global level, hybrid forms of coordination have taken 
the form of partnerships such as AgResults, which is a 
partnership between the governments of Canada, Australia, 
the United States, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
World Bank, and the commercial sector. With a strong focus 
on building capacity and leadership at country level and 
aiming for collaboration around a common goal, partners 
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bring their different skills and experience to participate 
in strategy, policy-setting, advocacy, fundraising, product 
development and procurement, country support and 
delivery. Part of the strategy is to use “pull” mechanisms to 
foster result-based financial incentives rewarding successful 
commercial and social innovations that address health and 
other social problems in a way that is financially sustainable 
and support economic development. In these, income can be 
accrued to social entrepreneurs and private sector partners 
from philanthropic and public funding upon accomplishment 
of specific deliverables that contribute to the health objectives 
of the partnership.
Financial Resources Provision and Mobilizations
One of the ways that government agencies can serve as a 
catalyst is through the provision or mobilization of funds for 
MSPs that they have initiated (eg, Food Trust in Philadelphia, 
USA), that have emerged from civil society organization 
leadership (eg, Quebec en Forme in Quebec, Canada), or from 
grassroots entrepreneurship (eg, Wholesome Wave across the 
United States). For instance, the Philadelphia Department 
of Public Health (with other states and federal departments) 
are lead policy partners in the Food Trust, a non-profit MSP 
devoted to access and affordability of nutritious food and 
information to make healthy choice to prevent obesity and 
NCDs. The Food Trust works with community organizations, 
schools, grocers, farmers and policy makers to invest in the 
corner stores in underserved neighborhoods. Their most 
recent innovation consists of a public-private partnership 
creating a US$30 million fund to leverage private investment 
to offer grants and loans to supermarkets and grocery stores 
located in underserved areas. This inspired the country-
level Healthy Food Financing Initiative launched by the 
Obama Administration in 2010, which provided $400 million 
towards bringing grocery stores and healthy food retailers 
to deprived communities. Results of this initiative are at the 
same time encouraging and sobering. While Philadelphia 
has been one of the first cities announced by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as having stopped 
the progression of the rise in obesity rates among children, 
results of a case control study conducted in Philadelphia 
found that for those communities that benefited from the 
supermarket and grocery store funding program, there was 
no measurable effect on fruit and vegetable consumption (the 
target of nutritional dietary improvement) nor on body mass 
index (BMI).48 Similar results were found for a supermarket 
introduced in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.49 
The second type of MSP is Québec En Forme, created as the 
deployment arm of a unique partnership launched in 2006 
and spearheaded by the Quebec Public Health Directorate, 
bringing a lead Canadian philanthropy (The Lucie and 
André Chagnon Foundation) with governmental signatories. 
Equal investment of both parties secured a yearly CAN 
$48 million funding for a decade in a WoS action plan to 
promote healthy lifestyle and environment, with 75% of the 
investment to be deployed through local communities in 
solutions suited to their respective needs and possibilities. 
Ten years into this initiative, the progression of childhood 
obesity has shown signs of plateauing and Quebec-en-forme 
created as an ad-hoc transitional organization that has now 
morphed into community-level collective impact partnership 
with direct engagement and investment for community and 
governmental actors at city- and state-levels, with still very 
little private sector engagement. 
Wholesome Wave in the United States taps into agriculture 
funds for food stamps to improve, in partnership with a rich 
diversity of partners from local communities and food system, 
the access and affordability of fresh fruit and vegetables to 
address obesity and NCDs in underserved communities. It 
does so by building capacity and fostering linkages between 
vulnerable populations and local food systems, while weaving 
behavioral economics principles to design incentives for both 
buyers and producers. Beyond governmental food stamps, 
complementary funding comes from individuals as well as 
local, state, national and global private sector and philanthropy. 
Their most recent innovation attempts to facilitate disease 
prevention in the healthcare system with fruit and vegetables 
prescriptions to adolescents struggling with obesity and 
mothers with diabetes from underserved communities. 
Together with government regulation of unhealthy foods, 
this approach appears promising. While rigorous research 
of the health outcomes is yet to come, this model and the 
entrepreneurship of Wholesome Wave leader has inspired 
the Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive Program (FINIP), 
established by the Agricultural Act of 2014 to provide $100 
million in federal grants between 2014 and 2018 to eligible 
entities that implement nutrition incentive programs. These 
programs provide individuals enrolled in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, or “food stamps”) with 
a monetary incentive when they purchase fruit and vegetables 
at participating retail venues. 
Conclusion
We suggest that there is a need to extend the debate on the 
instruments used by governments to facilitate collective 
action for NCD prevention. Specifically, we propose to 
broaden the definition of what government can do to foster 
collective action towards healthy food environments. This is 
what we call the catalyst role of government to institutionalize 
new paths of convergence for NCD prevention.
The catalyst role of government can take many forms and 
levels of involvement. State agencies can serve as members of 
networks or partnerships, or take a role of the structuring or 
management of networks.38 Abbott and colleagues50 propose 
that governments can serve as “orchestrators” to facilitate 
movement towards a “joint governance goal.” They suggest that 
states can contribute to collective action by providing material 
and ideational support. Material support “strengthens the 
… operational capacities” while ideational support “such as 
guidance, formal approval or political endorsement, enhances 
the … effectiveness and legitimacy vis-à-vis targets.”51 A 
WoS approach for NCD prevention demands a high level of 
diversity and innovation in governance.9,51 It is important to 
restate that these catalyst roles are not meant to supplant the 
regulatory role of government. The regulatory role remains 
critical in NCD prevention, and much work needs to be done 
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to expand the ability of government to control unhealthy food 
products. We draw attention to the catalyst role in order to 
stimulate discussion on how government can foster healthy 
consumer food environments while continuing to control 
unhealthy foods. 
The catalyst and the regulatory roles of government can 
and do co-exist. Given that most of the levers for change in 
the food system remain in the hands of private actors, an 
effective approach to create healthy food environments will 
require governments to foster healthy product production. 
Existing and new mechanisms can be put in place to ensure 
that engagement in the catalyst role does not impede the 
autonomy, accountability and transparency of government 
to effectively pursue their role as regulators. Future work on 
MSPs should therefore not only explore how state-actors can 
best engage in the catalyst role. It should also examine how 
to implement effective mechanisms to prevent partners from 
gaining privileged access or undue influence on public actors 
when they engage in their regulatory role.
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